Title | Author | Citation |
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Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System: 2021 Report to the Washington Supreme Court Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System: 2021 Report to the Washington Supreme Court March 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 1 Task Force 2.0 Editor's Note: As Editors-in-Chief of the Washington Law Review, Gonzaga Law Review, and Seattle University Law Review, we represent the flagship legal academic publications of each law school in Washington State. Our publications last joined together to publish the findings of the first Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System in 2011/12. A decade later, we are honored to join once again to present the findings of Task Force 2.0. Law journals have enabled generations of legal professionals to introduce, vet, and distribute new ideas, critiques of existing legal structures, and reflections on the development of our field. In the spirit of this tradition, we present this report in all three of our publications. This joint publication represents a unified recognition of the paramount importance of identifying and addressing racial disparities in our state’s justice system. As future legal professionals, we are proud to support this work and to amplify voices seeking to promote fairness and justice. |
Task Force 2.0 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 1 |
How Should Inheritance Law Remediate Inequality? How Should Inheritance Law Remediate Inequality? March 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 61 Felix B. Chang Abstract: This Article argues that trusts and estates (“T&E”) should prioritize intergenerational economic mobility—the ability of children to move beyond the economic stations of their parents—above all other goals. The field’s traditional emphasis on testamentary freedom, or the freedom to distribute property in a will as one sees fit, fosters the stickiness of inequality. For wealthy settlors, dynasty trusts sequester assets from the nation’s system of taxation and stream of commerce. For low-income decedents, intestacy (i.e., the system of property distribution for a person who dies without a will) splinters property rights and inhibits their transfer, especially to nontraditional heirs. |
Felix B. Chang | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 61 |
The New BailmentsMarch 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 97 Danielle D’Onfro Abstract: The rise of cloud computing has dramatically changed how consumers and firms store their belongings. Property that owners once managed directly now exists primarily on infrastructure maintained by intermediaries. Consumers entrust their photos to Apple instead of scrapbooks; businesses put their documents on Amazon’s servers instead of in file cabinets; seemingly everything runs in the cloud. Were these belongings tangible, the relationship between owner and intermediary would be governed by the common-law doctrine of bailment. Bailments are mandatory relationships formed when one party entrusts their property to another. Within this relationship, the bailees owe the bailors a duty of care and may be liable if they fail to return the property. The parties can use contracts to customize the relationship but not to disclaim the duty of care entirely. |
Danielle D’Onfro | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 97 |
Qualified Sovereignty March 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 155 Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater Abstract: Sometimes acts of the federal government cause harm; sometimes acts of contractors hired by the federal government cause harm. In cases involving the latter, federal contractors often invoke the sovereign’s constitutionally granted and doctrinally expanded supremacy to restrict avenues for the injured to recover even from private actors. In prior work, we analyzed how federal contractors exploit three “sovereign shield” defenses—preemption, derivative sovereign immunity, and derivative intergovernmental immunity—to evade liability, accountability, and oversight. |
Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 155 |
The Dignitary Confrontation Clause The Dignitary Confrontation Clause March 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 207 Erin Sheley Abstract: For seventeen years, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has been confused and confusing. In Crawford v. Washington (2004), the Court overruled prior precedent and held that “testimonial” out-of-court statements could not be admitted at trial unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even when the statement would be otherwise admissible as particularly reliable under an exception to the rule against hearsay. In a series of contradictory opinions over the next several years, the Court proceeded to expand and then seemingly roll back this holding, leading to widespread chaos in common types of cases, particularly those involving statements to law enforcement officers and written affidavits of crime lab technicians. In these cases, for apparently pragmatic reasons, various pluralities of the Court appear to have redefined “testimonial” to mean, at least in part, “potentially unreliable,” thereby contradicting the goal of Crawford. |
Erin Sheley | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 207 |
Queer and Convincing: Reviewing Freedom of Religion and LGBTQ+ Protections Post-Fulton v. City of PhiladelphiaMarch 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 265 Arianna Nord Abstract: Recent increases in LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws have generated new conversations in the free exercise of religion debate. While federal courts have been wrestling with claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment since the nineteenth century, city and state efforts to codify legal protections for LGBTQ+ individuals in the mid-twentieth century birthed novel challenges. Private individuals who do not condone intimate same-sex relationships and/or gender non-conforming behavior, on religious grounds seek greater legal protection for the ability to refuse to offer goods and services to LGBTQ+ persons. Federal and state courts must determine how to resolve these competing discriminations. This Comment addresses which standard of review federal courts ought to apply when considering whether LGBTQ+-protective laws violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. View Article × |
Arianna Nord | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 265 |
Let Us Not Be Intimidated: Past and Present Applications of Section 11(b) of The Voting Rights Act Let Us Not Be Intimidated: Past and Present Applications of Section 11(b) of The Voting Rights Act March 01, 2022 | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 301 Carly E. Zipper Abstract: As John Lewis said, “[the] vote is precious. Almost sacred. It is the most powerful non-violent tool we have to create a more perfect union.” The Voting Rights Act (VRA), likewise, is a powerful tool. This Comment seeks to empower voters and embolden their advocates to better use that tool with an improved understanding of its little-known protection against voter intimidation, section 11(b). |
Carly E. Zipper | 97 Wash. L. Rev. 301 |
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